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  The Enforcement of Rulings of the Supreme Court on Judicial Independence in Bangladesh: When Enforcer Becomes Violator
Volume 4, No. 2

M Rafiqul Islam , SM Solaiman

Associate Professor of Law, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia

Doctoral candidate, Faculty of Law, University of Wollongong, NSW, Australia

The independence of the judiciary is a fundamental feature of the Constitution of Bangladesh. Yet, more than 30 years after the founding of the modern state of Bangladesh, the judiciary remains subservient to an all-powerful executive. Between 1997-2001, the Supreme Court of Bangladesh issued binding judicial directives requiring the government immediately to separate the judiciary from the control of the executive. However, the government has adopted a strategy of procrastination and this has resulted in a public crisis of confidence in the state of the judiciary. This article explains why such a separation is indispensable for achieving judicial independence and considers why the executive is unwilling to establish a truly independent judiciary in Bangladesh.
 

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