Stephen Castles
Centre for Asia Pacific Social Transformation Studies (CAPSTRANS)
University of Wollongong

The Future of Australian Citizenship in a Globalising World

Paper presented at
The 50th Anniversary of Australian Citizenship Conference
University of Melbourne
21-23 July, 1999

[Draft 14 July, 7700 words approx]

Democratic citizenship, as we know it in Australia, is premised on a nation-state which has sovereignty over a specific territory demarcated by internationally agreed boundaries. In this model, the world consists of a multitude of such nation-states, each of which enjoys considerable autonomy in controlling its own economy, culture, and environment and society. The citizens are supposed to control the state through democratic processes, and the state is supposed to control what happens on its territory and to decide who or what may cross its boundaries.

But what happens if the boundaries get blurred? If the nation-state loses the ability to control cross-border flows of finance, commodities, people, ideas or pollution? If irresistible outside pressures reduce autonomy with regard to economic affairs, welfare rights or national culture? If national sovereignty is questioned by international environmental or human rights regimes? In these circumstances:
does the quality of democratic citizenship remain unchanged?
Are the citizens still the source of political legitimacy?
Do we need to rethink the meaning and mechanisms of citizenship to find new ways of maintaining popular sovereignty?
How can citizens influence decisions made by global markets, transnational corporations and international organisations?

These are the burning problems that face all democratic polities in this age of globalisation. Australia is no exception. Political and legal institutions derived from the Anglo-American democratic heritage have served us well for a century and more, but they may need significant changes if they are to master the new realities. The central question of this paper is thus:
What can we do to maintain and enhance democratic citizenship for Australians in the context of a globalising world?

To attempt to answer this question, the paper:
examines some of the inherent contradictions of nation-state citizenship;
discusses the meaning of globalisation and how it affects the nation-state and citizenship;
points to some impacts of globalisation on various sectors of Australian society;
looks at the significance of Australia's position in the emerging Asia Pacific region for our model of citizenship; and finally
makes suggestions for reforms that may be needed to maintain and enhance Australian democracy in the context of globalisation.

The contradictions of nation-state citizenship

In the 16th century, any European foolhardy enough to assert that the 'divine right of kings' was not an eternal truth might be executed for treason. Today, to claim that the democratic nation-state is not the end of history can evoke similar (if less lethal) hostility. Yet all around us we see the burgeoning of global and regional bodies exercising functions which used to be focussed on the national level. Global markets and transnational corporations are new bearers of economic power, while the growth of supranational bodies and international agencies represents a new ordering of political power. Rapid change is inescapable.

It is important to remember that democratic citizenship based on the nation-state is a specific historical form of fairly recent origin. The notion of a world of nation-states, each enjoying full sovereignty on its own territory, goes back to the 1648 Treaties of Westphalia. The notion of political legitimacy based on the collective will of the citizens derives from the French Revolution of 1789. It is only since 1945 that the democratic nation-state has become the global norm–and then more as an aspiration than a reality, for only a minority of countries can lay claim to a durable democracy.

Even before the new challenges posed by globalisation, nation-state citizenship contained some uneasy contradictions. If we ask 'what does citizenship mean?' in any given nation-state, we are really concerned with three distinct questions:
who can be a citizen in this nation-state?
what powers, rights and obligations derive from being a citizen? and
is it really possible for all citizens to enjoy the attributes that are meant to go with citizenship?

Analysis of each of these questions reveals major conceptual and practical problems ADDIN ENRfu (Castles 1999; Castles and Davidson 1999) . The question 'who can be a citizen?' reflects the fact that nation-state citizenship always means inclusion of a chosen group of people and exclusion of everyone else. Citizenship implies inclusion in the political community of everyone who lives on a nation-state's territory. But in historical reality, certain groups have not been considered fit to be citizens. Until quite recently this included women in most western countries. In many places exclusion from citizenship still affects certain racial groups, ethnic minorities, religious minorities and immigrants (and sometimes their descendants as well). Citizenship is meant to be universalistic and above cultural difference, yet is almost always linked to the notion of nationality–the idea that nationals of a certain nation are culturally distinct from members of all others. In Australia up to the 1960s, to be a citizen one either had to be of British origin or undergo a process of assimilation to become a national ADDIN ENRfu (Davidson 1997) . Multiculturalism has led to the principle that cultural difference is not inconsistent with being an Australian, yet this idea remains contested, as the rise of the One Nation Party demonstrated.

The second question, 'what powers, rights and obligations are linked to being a citizen?' points to the contradiction between the active and the passive citizen. The concept of popular sovereignty developed in the French Revolution was based on active citizens, who participated in the processes of law-making and governing. By contrast, earlier social contract theory involved passive citizens, who had rights to protection from unlawful activity, but were obliged to obey state authority. The struggle between these two models remains crucial. The model of active citizenship implies not only extending political rights to include everybody in society, but also–as T.H. Marshall emphasised in postwar Britain, creating the social and economic conditions that make it possible for even members of the working class to fully participate ADDIN ENRfu (Marshall 1950) . Recent neo-conservative attacks on the welfare state go back to the idea of a passive citizen defined through obligations–especially to work and to obey the law ADDIN ENRfu (Mead 1986) . For Australia, the issue is that our Constitution does not in any way guarantee active citizenship. By leaving issues of political participation and citizen rights to laws (which can potentially be changed), the door is open for conservative re-interpretations of political participation.

The third question, 'is it really possible for all citizens to enjoy the attributes that are meant to go with citizenship?' concerns the possible gap between legal rights and social reality. The quality of citizenship is diminished if certain groups who are legally full citizens experience exclusion based on gender, race, ethnicity or social class. Unfortunately, in most democracies growing numbers of people experience social exclusion so severe that it questions their participation as citizens ADDIN ENRfu (Mingione 1996) . For instance, in the USA, the poor are largely excluded from political participation–many are not even registered as voters, and participation in elections rarely exceeds 50 per cent. In Australia, voting is compulsory, yet certain groups have reduced chances of access to political power. Indigenous people and non-English speaking background immigrants are under-represented not only as parliamentarians, but also in power positions in the public service and the legal system ADDIN ENRfu (NMAC 1995) . If we add to this the growing social polarisation resulting from globalisation and economic restructuring, it is clear that popular sovereignty is not adequately entrenched in our institutions.

Thus our starting point is not a fully-functioning nation-state democracy that is threatened by globalisation, but rather an imperfect and contradictory system, that in any case requires reform to

improve the quality of citizenship. The effect of globalisation is to exacerbate the existing contradictions, as well as to create new ones.

Globalisation and the nation-state

To work out the consequences of globalisation for citizenship, we need to analyse how it affects the sovereignty and autonomy of the nation-state. At the most general level, globalisation refers to interlocking processes of change which affects all regions of the world. An important recent work on Global Transformations suggest the following characterisation:

Globalisation may be thought of initially as the widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life, from the cultural to the criminal, the financial to the spiritual. ADDIN ENRfu (Held et al. 1999, 2) (emphasis added).

The key indicator of globalisation is the rapid increase in cross-border flows of all sorts: finance, trade, people, ideas, drugs, pollution, global warming, media products and so on. The key organising structure for all these flows is the transnational network, which can take the form of the transnational corporation, the global market, the international governmental organisation, the international non-governmental organisation, or the global criminal syndicate (like the Cosa Nostra, the triads and the drug cartels). The key tool is modern information and communications technology, especially the Internet but also improved telephony, cheap air travel and so on. The rise of the global 'network society' ADDIN ENRfu (Castells 1996) is empirically verifiable, because we can measure the increase in 'extensity, intensity, velocity and impact of the flows and networks' ADDIN ENRfu (Held et al. 1999, 16) .

A massive literature on globalisation is developing, with widely differing assessments of the consequences for individuals and societies. For some observers, globalisation is a process of fundamental transformation, leading humanity into a new 'global age', which is the successor to the now exhausted 'modern age' ADDIN ENRfu (Albrow 1996) . For others, globalisation is much more limited, referring mainly to issues of trade and investment, and containing little which is qualitatively new. For some, globalisation offers huge opportunities for economic growth and improved living standards. Other commentators argue that globalisation erodes the autonomy of the nation-state, removing its ability to protect its citizens by means of economic management and welfare policies.

Held and associates suggest that approaches to globalisation can be divided into three broad categories, which they refer to as 'hyperglobalisers, sceptics and transformationalists' ADDIN ENRfu (Held et al. 1999, 3-10) . The hyperglobalisers believe that globalisation means a new epoch in human history in which nation-states will quickly become irrelevant, while transnational corporations and global markets will rule the world. Hyperglobalisers may see this as positive ADDIN ENRfu (eg. Ohmae 1991) or as threatening to democracy and labour rights ADDIN ENRfu (eg. Martin and Schumann 1997) .By contrast, the sceptics argue that nothing new is happening. They acknowledge the high levels of cross-border flows of trade, investment and labour, but point out that international economic integration in the period preceding the First World War was comparable with current levels ADDIN ENRfu (Hirst and Thompson 1996; Weiss 1997) .

If we chose to reject both extremes–the idea that a global society is nearly there and the idea that nothing is really changing–we are left with the transformationalist approach, which argues that globalisation is the consequence of interlinked and mutually reinforcing processes of change in the areas of technology, economic activity, governance, communications, the environment and so on. Contemporary cross-border flows are without historical precedent in volume and extent. These flows integrate virtually all countries into a global system, and thus bring about major social transformations at all levels. However, these trends are not necessarily indicators of global convergence or the emergence of a single 'world society'. Rather the transformationalists see globalisation as a complex process with unpredictable outcomes. It leads to new forms of stratification in which some individuals, communities or countries become integrated into global networks of power and prosperity, while others are excluded and marginalised. The new divisions cut across the old schisms of East-West and North-South: in the post-Cold War period social exclusion is to be found in all parts of the world. However, the most severe forms of exclusion affect the South: virtually the whole of Africa, as well as large parts of Asia and Latin America experience globalisation as disempowerment and impoverishment.

ADDIN ENRfu (Important contributions to the tranformationalist thesis include: Bauman 1998; Castells 1996; 1997; 1998; Giddens 1990; Hoogvelt 1997; Robertson 1992) .

Clearly, understanding globalisation in this way has major implications for the nation-state and citizenship. 'The 'modern nation-states' which developed from the 18th to the 20th century can be defined as:
Political apparatuses, distinct from both ruler and ruled, with supreme authority over a demarcated territorial area, backed by a claim to a monopoly of coercive power, and enjoying legitimacy as a result of a minimum level of support or loyalty from their citizens'. ADDIN ENRfu (Held et al. 1999, 45)

This model implies unquestioned sovereignty of a state over a bounded territory, as epitomised in the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs. But globalisation undermines this principle: the ever-increasing cross-border flows and the transnational networks which generate and regulate them can no longer be effectively controlled by nation-states. To this extent, states have lost a measure of sovereignty. Political control in many areas requires cooperation between states, and between them and transnational bodies. Thus states have lost a considerable portion of their autonomy. If international legal regimes and human rights principles can now lead to military intervention by the so-called 'international community' (as in Kosovo), then the nation-state has clearly lost the sanctity it was given in the Westphalian system.

This does not mean that globalisation is to be equated with a general reduction in the power of states. Rather, as the nexus between territory and sovereignty is undermined by globalising forces, new forms of governance emerge at the national, regional and global levels, with the military and economic power of the dominant states still playing a decisive role. A system of 'polyarchy' is emerging, marked by a diffusion of forms of political authority and types of political actor ADDIN ENRfu (Held et al. 1999, 50) . In this system the nation-state is just one level of power among other. Yet democracy and citizenship is still concentrated almost exclusively at the nation-state level. With a few exceptions (such as the European Parliament) there are no bodies elected by citizens at the supranational level. Thus citizen rights and democracy appear to be excluded from the emerging institutions of global power.

Here lies the great challenge: how can new forms of democracy be developed which recreate the conditions for active citizenship at all levels of decision-making? I will return to this issue at the end of the paper.

Globalisation and Australian sovereignty

In order to understand the current challenges to citizenship, it is useful to look at some of the effects of globalisation on Australian society. Every aspect of social life is affected in complex ways, and it is only possible to give a few examples here.

Economic flows and social justice

The first thing that most people think of in this context is economic globalisation, and its effects on living standards, jobs and welfare in Australia. Many of the major decisions that affect our economic well-being are no longer made by Australian business-people and governments, but rather by global markets and transnational corporations. Markets for money, shares, bonds, commodities and futures now allow electronic real-time trading from anywhere in the world 24 hours a day. Enormous values change hands daily (for instance and average US$1.4 trillion each day on foreign exchange markets alone) ADDIN ENRfu (Held et al. 1999, 209) , and huge fortunes can be made and lost on tiny margins. Flows of short-term speculative capital can fuel economic booms but lead equally quickly to crashes if capital-owners get nervous. This–rather than the weakness of local institutions–appears to be the underlying cause of the Asian Crisis, which in turn had significant effects on Australia ADDIN ENRfu (see Bezanson and Griffith-Jones 1999) .. Today, transnational corporations control around two-thirds of world trade, and are responsible for a large share of foreign direct investment. The largest of them have turnovers which exceed the GDP of many states.

The results of these developments were summed up nearly a decade ago by Robert Reich, the Secretary of Labour in the first Clinton Administration:

As almost every factor of production–money, technology, factories, and equipment–moves effortlessly across border, the very idea of a national economy is becoming meaningless… The same transformation is affecting every nation, some faster and more profoundly than others… ADDIN ENRfu (Reich 1991, 8) .

If this is true of the massive US economy, it is obviously even more the case for Australia's relatively small economy, which is heavily dependent on world trade. Global flows of capital and trade cannot be controlled by Australian governments. Nor are there so far any mechanisms for democratic control of the new networks of economic power by citizens–except in the very limited form of consumer choices. The result is that Australia has to adapt its economic structures and practices to global rules, rather than the other way round. Since the first postwar recession of the early 1970s. Australia has had little choice but to undertake successive ways of economic restructuring, trade liberalisation and privatisation. This has happened whatever party has been in power.

No country can make its own basic economic rules any more, although monetary, fiscal and trade policy can still be important within externally-set limits. For Australia the results of economic globalisation have included decline of certain industries and growth of others; increased unemployment; deskilling and increased insecurity for certain types of worker; decline of specific regions and neighbourhoods; and cuts and changes to the welfare state. Certainly, some people have benefited, but many have lost. Above all, in Australia as elsewhere, economic globalisation has meant increased inequality, with a new polarisation between executives with huge remuneration packages and large numbers of people lacking secure and adequate wages.

The key point in the context of citizenship is that the basic economic and social minimum needed to ensure full participation for all is no longer guaranteed for large groups in our population. Nor does it seem to be within the power of the Australian Government to substantially change this situation, for unilateral action would bring disciplinary measures from markets, international investors and possibly such global bodies as the IMF. Economic citizenship today could only be recreated by concerted action of citizens and governments to create new, democratically-controlled global regulatory bodies.

Environmental flows and global regulation

The environment is one area in which the reality of living on a single small planet has become inescapable. Acid rain and air pollution have no respect for human boundaries. We all have to share the oceans, and will suffer if they are contaminated or over-fished. Depletion of natural resources, loss of forests and reductions in arable land can affect the well-being and even the survival of people everywhere. Global warming and the greenhouse effect cannot be countered at the national level.

Consciousness of global environmental interconnectedness has grown since the 1970s, giving rise to a plethora of international agencies, conferences, and international non-governmental organisations. Important recent accords such as the Kyoto agreement on greenhouse gasses have demonstrated that national sovereignty has to be limited if the human habitat is to be preserved. International regulation is still far from adequate, and there are frequent clashes between short-term national interests and long-term global considerations: each country sees itself as a special case and tries to minimise its contribution to the common good, as we saw with Australia's special pleading on the place of coal in our economy.

How does this affect citizenship? Again, there is no formal place for democratic processes in the inter-state negotiations on environmental issues. But environmental groups like Greenpeace and the Worldwide Fund for Nature have shown that it is possible for citizens to make their voices heard at the global level. The important role of international non-governmental organisations in this area may point the way to transnational civil society and transnational citizenship. The recent dispute on the World Heritage listing of the Kakadu National Park showed that national governments have not given up their powers with regard to environmental issues, but equally that they cannot ignore international opinion in this area. In the end, the UNESCO World Heritage Commission was the decision-maker with regard to mining in the Kakadu, while the Australian Government took on the role of a lobbyist.

Cultural flows and identity

As pointed out above, citizenship in the nation-state model was closely linked to the idea of a national community with a common culture unique to a specific nation. This may always have been a myth, linked to suppression and assimilation of minority cultures, but at least it was a sustainable myth.

Globalisation has made the notion of closed and separate national cultures unsustainable. Cultural artefacts and values flow across borders in many forms. The most obvious is the electronic media: radio, television, video and the Internet. Cheap, rapid and safe mass travel is also important in exposing people to other cultures. Tourism changes both the people rich enough to enjoy it and the societies and environments they visit. Globally-produced and distributed commodities of all kinds contain cultural messages, which lead to standardisation of ways of life and erosion of local and national differences ADDIN ENRfu (see Bauman 1998; Martin and Schumann 1997) . The industrialisation of the means of cultural production and the establishment of vast cultural factories like Hollywood and Disneyland mean above all the diffusion of US-consumer capitalist values around the world. Australia, with its US-dominated media, is well advanced along this road.

However, it would be simplistic to think that global cultural flows are going to completely eliminate cultural differences and local and national identities. Resistance to globalisation often takes place primarily at the level of culture and identity, perhaps because of the near impossibility of controlling economic and politcal globalisation. Such resistance may take the form of attempts to recreate traditional identities, which can have exclusionary, sexist, racist and repressive characteristics: religious fundamentalism, identity sects and anti-immigrant movements ADDIN ENRfu (Castells 1997) . In this context we can understand the significance of Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party as an anti-globalisation movement designed to bolster the identity of groups genuinely threatened by the economic and cultural consequences of global change ADDIN ENRfu (Brett 1997; Castles 1996) .

Here too there is a lesson for citizenship: cultural identity is crucial for building new forms of transnational democracy, but it cannot be the old form of exclusionary national identity with its claims to uniqueness and even superiority over others. Here Australia has something of an advantage: our experience of building a multicultural society could help equip us for a role in rethinking the relationship between national communities and global belonging. Of course, the process of overcoming the white-Anglo cultural hegemony in our society is still far from complete, but at least we have taken some major steps in this direction ADDIN ENRfu (Vasta 1996) . The task at the global level is to work towards a situation in which recognition of distinct cultures goes hand-in-hand with social justice and equal rights for all.

Population flows and transnational communities

Australia's cultural diversity results of course not just from global cultural flows, but also from flows of people. The postwar immigration program made Australia one of the most culturally-diverse countries in the world–despite that fact that the original intention of the program was to keep the country white and British ADDIN ENRfu (Castles et al. 1992) . In recent years, immigration policies have become more restrictive with strong emphasis on possession of skills or capital as a qualification for entry. Despite this, Australia's borders remain highly porous. Newcomers enter not only as permanent settlers but increasingly also as temporary economic migrants, students and refugees. In addition, more and more Australians spend time working overseas to gain professional and cultural experience. Flows of people are an integral part of globalisation. Nation-states can regulate and steer such flows to some extent, but they cannot stop them. Here too Australia is not unique: similar trends are to be found not only in Europe and North America, but also in Asia and other regions of the South ADDIN ENRfu (Castles and Miller 1998) .

Ethnically and culturally diverse populations challenge the nation-state model of the citizen as a national. This challenge takes special forms in Australia. A first vital step is to work for full recognition of the unique identity and culture of Indigenous Australians. But the precondition for cultural recognition is social justice and political participation. In other words, there is no way forward for our collective cultural and political identity unless we can succeed in unblocking the Reconciliation process and moving forward towards redressing historical and current injustices.

A second challenge consists in the fact that immigrants from a wide range of countries may have different experiences and ideas about democracy and citizenship. Our adversarial political and legal systems may seem crude and ineffective to people from Asian or Pacific countries with traditions of building consensus and achieving change through negotiations and social trust. Other immigrants may have experience of more direct forms of democracy, with higher degrees of citizen involvement in decision-making processes than is customary here. Some European countries have developed systems of multi-level democracy, with elected representatives in the bodies which manage health services,

social security or housing. Here too, Australia has much to gain from a debate on new forms of participation.

Thirdly, one of the most important effects of globalisation is the emergence of transnational communities. Modern forms of transport and communication make it possible for migrants to maintain links with their countries of origin or with diaspora groups elsewhere in the world ADDIN ENRfu (Cohen 1997) . Despite our relative geographical isolation, it is now possible for settlers to move regularly between their place of origin and Australia. People may even commute back and forward in a regular way, as in the so-called 'astronaut' migration which links Australia and Hong Kong ADDIN ENRfu (Pe-Pua et al. 1998) . Increasing numbers of people actually live in more than one society, have multiple identities and are competent in more than one culture. This is a relatively new phenomenon, but is sure to increase in future. This makes it necessary to find ways of including people as citizens in more than one country simultaneously. Large numbers of Australians already have dual or multiple citizenship, but this is still seen officially as abnormal and problematic. Globalisation will make it necessary to accept multiple belonging and find ways of regulating it, for instance through different types of rights in different contexts. For instance, people may need economic rights in one society, cultural and family rights in another and political rights in both.

Political flows and global governance

The political arena is the most obvious place to examine the effects of globalising forces on citizenship. Important decisions are increasingly made at the international level. This process started with the foundation of the International Telegraph Union in 1865. By 1996 there were 260 intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) and 5472 international non-governmental organisations (INGOs). IGOs include the United Nations and its various agencies, other global bodies like the World Trade Organisation, regional bodies like the EU and APEC, legal bodies like the International Court of Justice, and specialised bodies in every imaginable area of production, trade, culture, human rights and so. The INGOs include international lobby groups of all kinds, aid agencies, employers' groups, trade union internationals, religious groups, cultural associations etc. International criminal cartels may also be considered as a special type of INGO. Between 1946 and 1975, the number of international treaties in force increased from 6351 to 14,061. Such treaties generally involve international consultation processes, frequently through special international bodies ADDIN ENRfu (data from Held et al. 1999, 53) .

It would be impossible here to even begin to describe the roles of such international bodies, and how they have gradually limited national sovereignty and autonomy. Some issues are regulated internationally because it is impractical to do so at the national level: telecommunications, transport and the environment are obvious examples. In other cases, international regulation is designed to achieve economic goals, such as freedom of trade and investment. However, many international regimes arise through the desire for minimum international standards, for instance with regard to personal freedom, labour standards and human rights.

International agreements and organisation create international law which coexists and often competes with national law. This is a major factor in eroding the national autonomy intrinsic to the Westphalian system of a world of nation-states. Often the role of international law is positive for citizens. For instance, many European citizens have turned to the European Court of Justice when they felt that national laws were unfair. In Australia, the absence of a Bill of Rights in our Constitution is partially redressed through our adherence to the International Bill of Human Rights which embraces the 1948 UN Declaration of Human Rights and various conventions on civil, political and economic rights. This can lead to conflicts between international and national law. The most recent development is this area is the doctrine that the 'international community' can use military force against a state that violates the rights of minorities within its own territory (as in Bosnia and Kosovo). But even Australia has been forced to answer to international institutions for its treatment of Indigenous people and other minorities. Thus 'the contemporary human rights regime consists of overlapping global, regional and national institutions and conventions' ADDIN ENRfu (Held et al. 1999, 67) .

It is clear that the nation-state is no longer the exclusive or even predominant source of law and political power. Rather, a multi-layered system of governance is emerging, in which the nation-state is just one centre of power (albeit an important one) among others. Citizens may well have more rights in international than in national law, but this positive aspect should not hide the democratic deficit in global governance: international law is not made by citizens or their elected representatives, but rather

by representatives of governments and of international bodies, who are not directly controlled by democratic processes. Thus, if we wish to maintain the quality of democratic citizenship, we have to find new ways in which citizens can participate in law-making and the exercise of political power at supranational levels. We need more democracy in more places to allow multiple levels of active citizenship.

Regionalisation: Australia in the Asia Pacific

Between the global and the national, a new level of governance is emerging. Globalisation makes it increasingly difficult for even the most powerful nations to stand alone in economic, political and strategic affairs. One result is a move towards regional cooperation and integration. Regionalisation may be seen as an alternative to globalisation, since regional trade blocks can help nation-states to withstand the forces of global trade and finance. But regionalisation is also closely linked to globalisation and may make national economies more capable of participating in global linkages. The most developed regional body is the European Union, which actually embodies the formal transfer of important aspects of state sovereignty to supranational organs. The 1991 Maastricht Treaty established European Citizenship, which constitutes new rights for citizens at a transnational level. However, European Citizenship does not replace national citizenship–rather it represents a multi-layered citizenship, which corresponds with the multiple levels of power implied by globalisation and regionalisation. Hence, Castells regards Europe today as an example of amentarity, but also some degree of shared political values and cultural characteristics. That is perhaps why integration has gone far further in Western Europe than elsewhere.

For Australia, as a country with a small population and a medium-sized economy, regional integration is vital to survival. Close relations with the fast growing East Asian economies have been a major policy priority since the 1980s. The dilemma is that our history and culture have tied us to distant Europe and North America, and made it hard for us to link up with our close neighbours. The decline of the British Empire, and the decision of the 'mother country' to join Europe left Australia isolated. We compensated through an alliance with the USA, which is still important in strategic terms, but offers no economic security. Two centuries of racism and fear of Asia makes it extraordinarily difficult for Australia to feel itself part of the Asia Pacific region. Similarly, in view of our colonial history, some regional leaders are reluctant to accept Australia as a close partner.

This has led to an on-going conflict over the desirable territorial framework for regional integration. Attempts to integrate the region over the last two decades have given rise to a range of bodies such as the Asia Pacific Economic (APEC) forum (based on a wide definition which includes not only Oceania but also the Western Pacific Rim countries) and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) (based on a much narrower sub-regional definition). The choice of the preferred regional concept is a response to differing economic and political interests. The broad APEC notion corresponds with Australian wishes to strengthen links with Asia without losing its traditional economic and strategic relationship with the USA, but is seen by some Asian leaders as a way of maintaining western domination of Asia. Hence the preference of such leaders for more narrow Asian linkages which exclude not only the USA but also Australia ADDIN ENRfu (Berger 1997) .

Such regional linkages are likely to have important consequences for democracy and citizenship in Australia and other regional countries. Many of our neighbours are post-colonial countries which are involved in complex processes of nation-state formation in situations of considerable ethnic and cultural diversity. Although the western nation-state model has been widely adopted, the new political institutions often mask deep cultural differences. Citizenship is a western notion based on cultural values derived from Western European traditions and Enlightenment philosophy. The development of democratic polities in western nations was the result of century-long historical processes of urbanisation, class formation and political struggle. Such processes have no parallel in Asia, except in the relatively short time-span of the anti-colonial struggle. Underlying values and historical experiences are very different. Thus it may not be easy to agree on notions of democracy, and on the relationship between state, nation and citizen in future processes of regional integration ADDIN ENRfu (see Davidson and Weekley 1999) .

With the end of the Cold War, debates on democracy and 'Asian values'. The East Asian developmental states were a far cry from the laissez-faire capitalism seen (often wrongly) as crucial to

western industrialisation. Some observers thought that industrialisation would lead to the emergence of middle classes, who would become agents of democratisation. For instance Fukuyama argued that the victory of capitalism meant that Asia would now follow the western trajectory, through which economic modernisation would bring about liberalisation and the rise of democracy ADDIN ENRfu (Fukuyama 1992) However, despite the development of many new 'civil society organisations' in Asian countries, it is far from clear that democracy has made substantial progress ADDIN ENRfu (Rodan 1996) . Another influential approach called for a strategic alliance between western and Asian countries, based on acceptance of different political and economic systems within the framework of strengthened international institutions. This approach became dominant in US foreign policy during the Bush Administration of the late 1980s, leading to US support for APEC ADDIN ENRfu (Berger and Borer 1997, 19) .

Another school of thought, associated with the work of Huntington ADDIN ENRfu (1993) , saw Asia's resurgence as being based on value systems incompatible with western values. This would lead to a 'clash of civilisations'. In this analysis, the notion of 'Asian values' (or 'Confucianism') was put forward as an explanation of the difference between Asian and western forms of social and economic organisation. The argument was that group solidarity and conformity could give Asia an advantage over the west, with its emphasis on rationality, individualism and human rights. Such western interpretations appear as a new form of Orientalism, which homogenises diverse Asian cultures in a culturally-deterministic way. However, it is important to note that some Asian leaders put forward similar notions. Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore and Prime Minister Mahahtir of Malaysia have emphasised the importance of the 'Asian way' in achieving economic growth. They see the moral laxity and individualism of the west as a cause of decline, and argue that 'Asian values' like thrift, hard work, loyalty to family and community are superior.

The Asian Crisis which started in 1997 appeared both as a threat to the global economy and as a vindication of the western model. The 'Asian virtues' were suddenly reinterpreted as nepotism, corruption, cronyism and lack of sound financial regulation. Western economists called for liberalisation of markets and strict financial discipline. Leaders like Korean President Kim Dae-jung asserted the need for democratic control, while institutions like the World Bank suddenly discovered the social aspects of economic developments. The debate continues. Although western institutions are being imported into many of Asia's new polities, they have to adapt to very different historical and philosophical contexts. Today, Australia stands at a fault-line between West and East. We cannot simply make an assumption of the superiority of our own approaches, if we are to find a place in an emerging Asia Pacific region. This dilemma of the East-West encounter in a regional context may not be an obvious theme for a conference on Australian citizenship, but it may a vital factor for our future.

Transnational citizenship and globalisation from below

We live in a period of transition: the nation-state model which has developed over the last few centuries as the main focus of political legitimacy and action is beginning to be supplanted by a new model of multi-layered governance, involving new political actors at sub- and supranational levels. The nation-state has not ceased to be important and will not for the foreseeable future, but its power and autonomy are becoming more limited, through the development of a 'system of multiple power centres and overlapping spheres of authority' ADDIN ENRfu (Held et al. 1999, 441) . Yet citizenship continues to be focussed at the national level. This has serious consequences for democracy.

To start with, electoral choices are becoming increasingly meaningless. All the major political parties tend to respond to global trends with similar policies. For the large sections of the population who feel threatened by globalisation, it makes little difference whether the ALP or the Coalition are in power: both have broadly parallel policies on trade liberalisation, deregulation and welfare restriction. The result may be political passivity or apathy for the majority, while a minority seeks a solution in tribalist right-wing 'backlash politics' ADDIN ENRfu (Falk 1996) –the Hanson phenomenon. Such trends in turn lead to increased social distance and decreased solidarity between the bulk of the population and the elite who benefit through participation in global networks ADDIN ENRfu (Reich 1991) .

If globalisation undermines nation-state citizenship, one response, especially from the left has been to seek to counter it through attempts to revive the nation-state and to create new ideologies of national

solidarity ADDIN ENRfu (Reich 1991; Schnapper 1994) . In the European context, the EU has been seen as a possible bulwark against globalising forces ADDIN ENRfu (Martin and Schumann 1997) . In recent years, social democratic parties have tried to shift priorities from free trade and monetary stability to employment creation and enhanced welfare systems–with mixed success. In the long run, though, the forces of globalisation seem too powerful to be countered by single states or even by regional bodies. Concentration on the nation-state means giving up on citizenship–democracy will not be rescued by trying to re-erect national boundaries. We have to think ahead and invent new forms of transnational citizenship, which will allow us to counter the globalisation-from-above imposed by corporations, markets and governments with a globalisation-from-below based on citizens and communities.

By definition, transnational citizenship cannot be created at the national level. Trends to transnational civil society and political action are already well developed in the action of the many international non-governmental organisations active with regard to the environment, women's issues, labour rights, human rights and development. Such organisations have been effective in developing an alternative global culture, using new communication technologies and forming national, regional and international networks ADDIN ENRfu (see for instance Diokno 1999) . Increasing numbers of political activists take an emerging global civil society as their point of reference, which in turn reflects a disenchantment with national politics. But all global actions start at the local and national levels, so it important to think what steps are needed in Australia to prepare the way for new forms of democratic citizenship.

It is important to begin by improving the quality of Australian citizenship where it appears deficient. Secure rights at the national level can be a springboard to transnational political participation. This involves a number of issues:

Recognition of the special position of Indigenous Australian, and implementation of a range of measures to combat racism and to allow their full political, economic, social and cultural participation in society.

Measures to combat social exclusion and to ensure that everybody enjoys a sufficient standard of economic and social citizenship to permit political participation. This involves finding ways to rebuild social security systems and to renew commitments to educational equality.

Reform of the Constitution to inscribe rights of active citizenship in a Bill of Rights.

Reassertion of our model of multicultural citizenship, to codify the twin rights of cultural recognition and social justice for all, irrespective of ethnic, cultural or religious identity. This could involve reform of institutions to remove cultural biases and to introduce alternative notions of direct democracy, non-adverserial proceseses and development of social trust.

On this basis, it would be possible to take an active part in developing models of transnational citizenship and participation in global governance. Here Australian citizens, NGOs and governments would have to work together with counterparts in other countries and at the global level. The following suggestions could form part of a strategy:

Full recognition of dual or multiple citizenship for migrants and their descendants. This could be linked to the notion of differentiated or segmented citizenship based on actual forms of participation in a society ADDIN ENRfu (Bauböck 1994) . In other words, someone who works in one country, but has strong family and social ties in another may need different forms of rights in each.

Participation in all sorts of bodies that can influence a democratising influence on the various layers of power at the sub-national, national, supranational and transnational levels. This involving building a global civil society and developing a transnational public sphere, to help citizens gain the information and networks needed for effective participation.

Working to improve democratic processes at the transnational level. At the moment, corporations, market forces and intergovernmental bodies have power, but lack democratic legitimacy. They are confronted by international non-governmental organisations which often (though not always) have democratic legitimacy, but lack any real decision-making power. The demand must be for elected

bodies to control all the new centres of transnational power. The enhanced role of the European Parliament is an important example here. Similar representative bodies are needed to control the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO, APEC, ASEAN and so on. Here it would be useful to develop Johann Galtung's suggestion that the UN should not only have a General Assembly (which represents governments) but also a People's Assembly (representing non-governmental organisations) and a Corporate Assembly (representing transnational corporations) ADDIN ENRfu (Galtung 1996) .

Work at the regional level to enhance democracy and to improve Australian participation in moves towards regional integration. This means that we must stop taking a short-term view by supporting anti-democratic forces where this seems economically expedient. In the long run our interest lies in helping to build democratic civil societies capable of facilitating sustainable development. In retrospect, most people would agree that Australian servility to the Soeharto regime has not been a successful policy, and we should be careful to avoid such strategies in future. At the same time, we have to work hard to shake off our colonial past. We must be prepared to for dialogue with our neighbours, rather than simply seeking to impose western models, if we want to achieve lasting cooperation.

Development of a transnational civic culture conducive to peace and democracy. The western model of citizenship has always pitted the citizens of one nation-state against those of all the others. Thus nationalism and even racism were closely linked to citizenship in European history. The 'warrior-citizen' was always prepared to defend the nation against all comers, giving rise to the disastrous wars of the 20th century. Unfortunately, national democracy and industrialised slaughter are anything but antitheses. Global democracy cannot be based on the warrior-citizen model. It is therefore necessary to develop models of civics education designed to strengthen capabilities of cross-cultural communication and to reduce the support for institutionalised violence as a means of political action.

These are just a few ideas for action to improve the quality of Australian citizenship and to begin the long process of building transnational citizenship. They need a lot more development, and I am sure many other approaches can be put forward. I hope that these suggestions will help stimulate debate on the need for new forms of political participation and action if democracy is to play a part in a globalising world.

References

ADDIN ENBbu Albrow, Martin. 1996. The Global Age. Cambridge: Polity.
Bauböck, Rainer. 1994. "Changing the boundaries of citizenship: the inclusion of immigrants in democratic polities." Pp. 199-232 in From Aliens to Citizens: Redefining the Status of Immigrants in Europe, edited by Rainer Bauböck. Aldershot: Avebury.
Bauman, Zygmunt. 1998. Globalization: the Human Consequences. Cambridge: Polity.
Berger, Mark T. 1997. "Conclusion: the coming of the Pacific Century: the Cold War and after in the Asia-Pacific." in The Rise of East Asia: Critical Visions of the Pacific Century, edited by Mark T. Berger and Douglas A. Borer. London and New York: Routledge.
Berger, Mark T., and Douglas A. Borer (Eds.). 1997. The Rise of East Asia: Critical Visions of the Pacific Century. London and New York: Routledge.
Bezanson, Keith, and Stephany Griffith-Jones. 1999. "The East Asian Crisis: a global problem requiring global solutions." IDS Bulletin 30.
Brett, Judith. 1997. "John Howard, Pauline Hanson and the politics of grievance." in The Resurgence of Racism, edited by G. Gray and C. Winter. Melbourne: Monash Papers in History.
Castells, Manuel. 1996. The Rise of the Network Society. Oxford: Blackwells.
Castells, Manuel. 1997. The Power of Identity. Oxford: Blackwells.
Castells, Manuel. 1998. End of Millenium. Oxford: Blackwells.
Castles, Stephen. 1996. "The racisms of globalisation." Pp. 12-45 in The Teeth are Smiling: The Pesistence of Racism in Multicultural Australia, edited by Ellie Vasta and Stephen Castles. Sydney: Allen and Unwin.
Castles, Stephen. 1999. "Citizenship and the Other in the age of migration." Pp. 27-48 in Globalization and Citizenship in the Asia-Pacific, edited by Alastair Davidson and Kathleen Weekley. London: Macmillan.

Castles, Stephen, and Alastair Davidson. 1999. Citizenship and Migration: Globalisation and the Politics of Belonging. London: Macmillan.
Castles, Stephen, Mary Kalantzis, Bill Cope, and Michael Morrissey. 1992. Mistaken Identity: Multiculturalism and the Demise of Nationalism in Australia. Sydney: Pluto Press.
Castles, Stephen, and Mark J. Miller. 1998. The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World. London: Macmillan.
Cohen, Robin. 1997. Global Diasporas: An Introduction. London: UCL Press.
Davidson, Alastair. 1997. From Subject to Citizen: Australian Citizenship in the Twentieth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Davidson, Alastair, and Kathleen Weekley (Eds.). 1999. Globalization and Citizenship in the Asia-Pacific. London: Macmillan.
Diokno, Maria Serena I. 1999. "The democratizing function of citizenship in the Philippines." Pp. 134-53 in Globalization and Citizenship in the Asia-Pacific, edited by Alastair Davidson and Kathleen Weekley. London: Macmillan.
Falk, Richard. 1996. "The decline of citizenship in an era of globalisation." Pp. 1-19 in Globalisation and citizneship: an international conference. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.
Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. The End of History and the Last Man. London: Penguin.
Galtung, Johann. 1996. "The nation state and citizenship: and then global citizenship? the cultural, political and institutional background." Pp. 1-26 in Globalisation and citizneship: an international conference. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.
Giddens, Anthony. 1990. The Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge: Polity.
Held, David, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and J. Perraton. 1999. Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture. Cambridge: Polity.
Hirst, Paul, and Grahame Thompson. 1996. Globalization in Question. Cambridge: Polity.
Hoogvelt, Ankie. 1997. Globalisation and the Postcolonial World. Basingstoke and London: Macmillan.
Huntington, Samuel. 1993. "The clash of civilisations." Foreign Affairs 72:22-49.
Marshall, T.H. 1950. Citizenship and Social Class. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Martin, Hans-Peter, and Harald Schumann. 1997. The Global Trap: Globalization and the Assault on Prosperity and Democracy. London and New York, and Sydney: Zed Books and Pluto Press Australia.
Mead, L. 1986. Beyond Entitlement: the Social Obligations of Citizenship. New York: Free Press.
Mingione, Enzo (Ed.). 1996. Urban Poverty and the Underclass. Oxford: Blackwell.
NMAC, (National Multicultural Advisory Council). 1995. Multicultural Australia, The Next Steps: Towards and Beyond 2000. (Two Volumes) Canberra: AGPS.
Ohmae, Kenichi. 1991. The Borderless World. New York: Harper Collins.
Pe-Pua, Rogelia, Colleen Mitchell, Stephen Castles, and Robyn Iredale. 1998. "Astronaut families and parachute children: Hong Kong immigrants in Australia." Pp. 279-97 in The last half century of Chinese overseas, edited by Elizabeth Sinn. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
Reich, Robert B. 1991. The Work of Nations. London: Simon and Schuster.
Robertson, Roland. 1992. Globalisation: Social Theory and Global Culture. London, Newbury Park & New Delhi: Sage.
Rodan, Garry (Ed.). 1996. Political Oppositions in Industrialising Asia. London: Routledge.
Schnapper, Dominique. 1994. La Communauté des Citoyens. Paris: Gallimard.
Vasta, Ellie. 1996. "Dialectics of domination: racism and multiculturalism." in The teeth are smiling: The persistence of racism in multicultural Australia, edited by Ellie Vasta and Stephen Castles. Sydney: Allen and Unwin.
Weiss, Linda. 1997. "Globalization and the myth of the powerless state." New Left Review :3-27.